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Development projects and indigenous peoples’ land 
Defining the scope of free, prior and informed consent 
Mauro Barelli 
 
Introduction 
Indigenous peoples have a special relationship with their traditional territories and resources, 
which not only represent their main means of subsistence but also form an integral part of 
their cultural identity.2 For indigenous peoples, the land is the home of the ancestors, the 
provider of everyday material needs and the future held in trust for coming generations 
(Zhora Ksentini 1991, para. 25). It follows that respecting the lands, territories and resources 
of indigenous peoples is vital for the survival of these groups as distinct societies.3 The 
indigenous approach to lands and resources, however, is at odds with a global economic 
model that promotes the constant exploitation of natural resources and expansion of 
supportive infrastructures. Since many of these resources are found on lands traditionally 
owned and controlled by indigenous peoples, an inevitable conflict between competing 
claims and interests erupts (Tauli-Corpuz 2006, 20). Given the disparity of power of the 
parties to the dispute, economic and industrial development has traditionally taken place 
without recognition of and respect for indigenous peoples’ cultural attachment to their lands 
(Daes 2001, para. 132). The criticality of this ‘conflict’ has been recently highlighted by the 
UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Special Rapporteur), who noted 
that the question of development projects affecting indigenous lands ‘has become one of the 
foremost concerns of indigenous peoples worldwide, and possibly also the most pervasive 
source of the challenges to the full exercise of their rights’. (Anaya 2011, para. 57). 
The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) has the merit of 
directly addressing this important issue. In particular, Article 32(2) establishes that states 
shall consult and co-operate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned in order to 
obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their 
lands.4 The broad and uncontroversial principle recognized by Article 32(2) is that indigenous 
peoples’ views and interests should be taken into account by the relevant governments before 
taking on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples decision concerning their lands. That said, the 
elusive wording of the provision leaves a fundamental question unanswered: are states 
required to obtain the consent of indigenous peoples before authorizing or launching 
development projects on their lands, or simply seek, and, therefore, not necessarily obtain, 
such consent? 
This chapter seeks to provide an answer to this important question by examining the legal 
significance and implications of the flexible approach to free, prior and informed consent 
(FPIC) that has recently gained increasing recognition at the international level (Barelli 
2012). First, the chapter will clarify the meaning of the first three components of FPIC, 
namely ‘free’, ‘prior’ and ‘informed’. Following on that, it will discuss the meaning of 
‘consent’, examining the drafting history of Article 32(2) and placing it within the normative 
context of the Declaration.5The chapter will then proceed to highlight the way in which other 
international instruments and bodies have tackled the question of FPIC and development 
projects on indigenous lands. Finally, it will draw some conclusions as to the scope and value 
of FPIC in the context of the indigenous rights regime. 
 
 The meaning of free, prior and informed consent 
The recognition of the principle of FPIC in Article 32(2) reinforces significantly the right of 
indigenous peoples to be consulted with regard to projects affecting their lands. At a 
minimum, FPIC requires that the relevant consultations should not be a mere formality, but, 
rather, should be conducted in good faith and with the objective of finding a common 
agreement. As noted in the previous section, however, FPIC may also be understood in a 
more radical manner, namely one requesting that all, or certain, projects should not be 
implemented in the absence of the consent of indigenous peoples. It is, therefore, crucial to 
clarify the meaning and scope of FPIC in order to determine the extent and limits of the 
relevant rights enjoyed by indigenous peoples. 
As is often the case with concepts and principles, there is no universally agreed definition 
of FPIC in international law. Against this background, the ‘common practical understanding’ 
of FPIC elaborated by the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (Forum)6 represents a 
valuable reference point.7 According to this understanding, the term ‘free’ implies that 
consultations should be conducted in the absence of any form of coercion, intimidation or 
manipulation. The term ‘prior’, instead, implies that consent must be sought sufficiently in 
advance of any authorization or commencement of activities and that the relevant agents 
should guarantee enough time for indigenous consultation processes to take place. Finally, 
the term ‘informed’ implies that indigenous peoples should receive satisfactory information 
in relation to certain key elements, including the nature, size, pace, reversibility and scope of 
the proposed project, the reasons for launching it, its duration and a preliminary assessment 
of its economic, social, cultural and environmental impact. Crucially, this information should 
be accurate and in a form that is accessible, meaning that indigenous peoples should fully 
understand the relevant language. In more general terms, consultations should be undertaken 
in good faith, and the full and equitable participation of indigenous peoples should be 
guaranteed. Indigenous peoples should also have equal access to financial, human and 
material resources in order to engage constructively in the process. Finally, they should be 
able to participate through their own freely chosen representatives and according to their 
customs. 
The above description identifies the various phases and components of FPIC intended as a 
process of consultation and participation. More precisely, it indicates the manner in which 
states should conduct the relevant consultations in order for these to be lawful and 
meaningful.8What remains to be established is the actual meaning of the term ‘consent’, that 
is to say, whether consultations should necessarily lead to an agreement between states and 
indigenous peoples, or whether the former could act even in the absence of such consent. 
This is not to suggest that discussions regarding FPIC should only be framed in terms of 
whether or not indigenous peoples have a right to veto (Anaya 2009, para. 48). As explained 
above, FPIC refers to a much broader process of which ‘consent’ is only one (important) 
component. That said, the question as to whether indigenous peoples may have the right ‘to 
say no’ must be specifically addressed, because the recognition of this right may have 
important implications for the manner in which the broader process of consultation is 
conducted (Laplante and Spears 2008).9 In particular, taking part in consultations knowing 
that one will hardly be able to oppose the outcome of the process is one thing; doing so with 
the awareness that the final decision might be successfully affected, or even rejected, is quite 
another. It follows that, by virtue of a right ‘to say no’, indigenous peoples could exercise 
more effective control over the various stages of the consultation process. It is also vital to 
shed some light on this question in order to prevent states, or any other interested actor, from 
justifying non-compliance with the UNDRIP on the basis of obscurity (or alleged obscurity) 
of the relevant legal standards (Anaya 2009, para. 66). 
FPIC and Article 32(2) of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples 
Article 32(2) of the Declaration establishes that: 
states shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned 
through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed 
consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other 
resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of 
mineral, water or other resources. 
As was noted in the introductory section, this provision suffers from a lack of clarity. At the 
centre of the controversy lies the interpretation of the expression ‘consult in order to obtain’: 
Do states have the stringent obligation to obtain the consent of indigenous peoples, or do they 
simply have to seek such consent? In order to clarify this important question, it is useful to 
consider the drafting history of Article 32(2) and subsequently try to interpret the latter in the 
context of the broader normative framework of the Declaration. 
The original version of the provision, contained in the 1993 draft declaration that was 
adopted by the Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP),10 affirmed that: 
Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for 
the development or use of their lands, territories and other resources, including the right 
to require that states obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any 
project affecting their lands, territories and other resources, particularly in connection 
with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources. 
This provision clearly provided that no project affecting the lands of indigenous peoples 
could take place without their free, prior and informed consent. In fact this amounted to 
recognizing a wide right to veto for indigenous peoples. The important point to make here is 
that the 1993 draft declaration was essentially the product of the five independent members of 
the WGIP and indigenous representatives, because states’ delegates did not actively 
participate in the sessions of this body. This is so because, in their view, their interests would 
be better protected at the level of the (then) UN Commission on Human Rights, where, in the 
words of the then Australian minister for Aboriginal Affairs, ‘indigenous voices were not 
expected to be heard with such strength and determination and where governments had in the 
past dictated the agenda free of non-governmental … interference’ (Tickner 2001, 303). 
Accordingly, when the draft declaration reached the Commission on Human Rights, states 
expressed significant reservations with respect to a number of key provisions. As a result, the 
Commission on Human Rights set up the Working Group on the Draft Declaration (WGDD) 
with the sole purpose of further elaborating the text of the draft declaration.11 
Over the sessions of the WGDD it became clear that several states opposed the fact that 
indigenous peoples could have the power to veto development projects allegedly of benefit to 
the entire country, because this would critically impair their ability to control natural 
resources for the purpose of national development. Accordingly, they sought to modify the 
wording of Article 32(2) with a view to softening their obligations towards  indigenous 
peoples. For example, it was proposed that states should ‘take account of the free and 
informed consent of indigenous peoples in the approval of any project affecting their lands 
and resources’.12 Other proposals were even weaker than those just mentioned as they used 
expressions such as ‘states shall use their best efforts to obtain’, or ‘where possible, states 
shall undertake effective consultations’.13 
Ultimately, states’ objections to the original wording of Article 32(2) were partially 
successful, as the final version of the provision now requests that they consult indigenous 
peoples in order to obtain their consent rather than actually obtaining it. A number of 
considerations can be made in respect of the final wording of Article 32(2). On the one hand, 
it seems fairly clear that the expression ‘consult in order to obtain’ should not be interpreted 
as requesting states to obtain the consent of indigenous peoples before implementing any 
project affecting their lands. Had this been the case, the original version of the article, which 
de facto recognized a general right to veto, would have been preserved. That Article 32(2) 
should be interpreted more restrictively is further supported by various declarations made by 
states’ representatives following the adoption of the UNDRIP by the General Assembly.14 
On the other hand, there exist strong arguments against an interpretation of FPIC that 
would confer on indigenous peoples a mere right to consultation. First, most provisions of the 
Declaration are the product of difficult compromises between two competing views, and 
should, therefore, be interpreted in accordance with their nature. With respect to Article 
32(2), it is particularly telling that the rather weak versions of the provision supported by 
several states (mentioned above) were ultimately abandoned. This suggests that overly 
restrictive interpretations of FPIC cannot be validly upheld. Second, and more importantly, 
FPIC should be read in conjunction with the broader normative framework of the UNDRIP. 
In particular, the Declaration fully recognizes the special attachment of indigenous peoples 
with their ancestral lands. Amongst others, Article 25 establishes that indigenous peoples 
have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual relationship with their 
ancestral lands, while Article 26 affirms that indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, 
develop and control their lands, territories and resources. 
It should also be highlighted that Article 3 of the Declaration recognizes that indigenous 
peoples have the right to self-determination and that, by virtue of that right, they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development. In light of the above, to allow that development projects could take place on the 
lands of indigenous peoples without their consent and regardless of the consequences that the 
concerned activities could have on their cultures and lives would seem incompatible with 
both the spirit and normative framework of the Declaration. This would also seem to frustrate 
the very purpose of creating a special legal regime for indigenous peoples’ rights, as the latter 
are aimed at protecting not only the physical but also cultural integrity of these peoples. 
It is, therefore, clear that Article 32(2) must necessarily be approached with a certain 
degree of flexibility. With this in mind, the next sections will highlight how the jurisprudence 
and practice of various judicial and quasi-judicial bodies have contributed to define the legal 
contours of a flexible understanding of FPIC that promises to address in a constructive 
manner the important problems highlighted above. 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR or Court) has developed a significant 
jurisprudence in relation to indigenous land rights since the early 2000s (Pasqualucci 2008). 
The IACtHR has approached these rights in the context of Article 21 of the Inter-American 
Convention on Human Rights (Inter-American Convention) on the right to property.15 Taking 
into account the most recent international normative developments in the sphere of 
indigenous peoples’ rights, the IACtHR has established that Article 21 also protects the right 
of the members of indigenous groups to collectively own their ancestral lands. This ground-
breaking interpretation, introduced for the first time in the 2001 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas 
Tingni Community vs. Nicaragua case,16 and later confirmed in a number of equally 
significant cases,17essentially stems from the preliminary recognition of the special 
relationship existing between indigenous peoples and their lands. 
In the case of Saramaka People vs. Suriname,18 the Court also dealt with the issue of 
natural resources pertaining to indigenous lands, making express references to both FPIC and 
Article 32(2) of the UNDRIP.19 In this case the Court had to determine, among other things, 
whether logging and mining concessions awarded by Suriname to third parties on the 
ancestral lands of the Saramaka people amounted to a violation of their property rights under 
Article 21 of the Inter-American Convention. The Court first acknowledged that Article 21 
also protects the rights of indigenous peoples to own and enjoy the natural resources found 
within their ancestral lands.20 After establishing this general principle, it specified that the 
resources protected under Article 21 are only those necessary for the survival of indigenous 
peoples, that is to say, resources associated to agricultural, hunting and fishing activities. 
Having said that, the Court observed that exploiting natural resources that are not necessary 
for the survival of indigenous peoples, e.g. subsoil resources, may nevertheless have 
important consequences on the cultures and lives of these peoples, for they may impact on the 
resources necessary for their survival. Accordingly, Article 21 may also impose limits on 
what states can and cannot do in relation to the exploitation of these (unnecessary) resources. 
This, however, must not be read as an affirmation of absolute protection of indigenous 
peoples’ rights. As the IACtHR noted, Article 21 ‘should not be interpreted in a way that 
prevents the state from granting any type of concession for the exploration and extraction of 
natural recourses’ within a territory owned by an indigenous community.21 Instead, limitations 
and restrictions to the rights of indigenous peoples to their natural resources are possible, but 
only under specific circumstances. Following the same principles elaborated in the context of 
land rights generally (Barelli et al. 2011), the Court found that restrictions are possible only if 
they are established by law, are necessary and proportional, and have the aim of achieving a 
legitimate objective in a democratic society.22 Further safeguards are nevertheless needed in 
order ‘to preserve, protect and guarantee the special relationship that [indigenous peoples] 
have with their territory, which in turn ensures their survival’.23 Accordingly, a state which 
intends to launch or authorize a project affecting the natural resources found within 
indigenous lands will have to respect the following obligations: first, ensure the effective 
participation of the members of the community in any development, or investment, plan; 
second, ensure that the concerned people have a reasonable share of the benefits; third, 
perform or supervise prior environmental and social impact assessments; and, fourth, 
implement adequate safeguards and mechanisms so as to avoid that the concerned activities 
significantly affect the conditions of the traditional lands and natural resources at stake.24 
For the purpose of this chapter, special attention should be paid to the first obligation 
listed above, namely the obligation to ensure the effective participation of indigenous 
peoples. As a general rule the Court noted that states have a duty to consult with the 
indigenous peoples concerned. Indeed, in the Court’s view, this duty should now be regarded 
as a general principle of international law.25 In carrying out this duty, states must act in good 
faith, provide sufficient information and respect the indigenous customs and traditions. 
Crucially, the objective of the consultation should be the reaching of an agreement among the 
parties. This clearly means that states must not necessarily obtain the consent of indigenous 
peoples before a project may take place on their lands. 
After establishing this general principle, however, the Court introduced a crucial 
distinction between small-scale and large-scale development projects, endorsing the view that 
under certain circumstances indigenous peoples should be entitled to more rigorous 
protection. More precisely, it held that, in the case of large-scale development projects that 
would have a major impact within indigenous peoples’ territories, states have a duty not only 
to consult with indigenous peoples, but also to obtain their free, prior and informed 
consent.26 The same degree of protection must be guaranteed when the cumulative effects of a 
number of small-scale projects would resemble that of a large-scale project.27 
By establishing different legal regimes with regard to small-scale and large-scale 
development projects, the IACtHR has provided an answer to the difficult questions 
concerning the interpretation of Article 32(2) that were highlighted in the previous section. It 
did so by promoting a ‘sliding scale approach’ to the question of indigenous participatory 
rights that is based on the key assumption that the ‘level of effective participation [that must 
be guaranteed to indigenous peoples] is essentially a function of the nature and content of the 
rights and activities in question’ (Pentassuglia 2009, 116). This means that, when a project is 
likely to have a major (negative) impact on the territories, lives or cultures of indigenous 
peoples, states have a duty not only to consult them, but, also, to obtain their FPIC. 
Human rights treaty bodies 
International human rights treaties do not refer expressly to FPIC. They also lack any 
expressed reference to indigenous peoples’ rights. However, the bodies entrusted to monitor 
and promote their implementation have gradually developed extensive interpretations of their 
generic provisions in order to protect, inter alia, the special cultural attachment of indigenous 
peoples to their lands (Thornberry 2002). This is particularly true with regard to the Human 
Rights Committee (HRC), which contributed prominently to the elaboration of international 
legal standards concerning indigenous peoples. The HRC did so by promoting a progressive 
interpretation of the right to culture included in Article 27 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) so as to secure, among others, the right of indigenous 
peoples to conduct traditional economic activities and to live in harmony with their lands and 
resources.28 
The HRC has dealt with FPIC in a number of pronouncements on individual 
communications. In this respect, the case of Ilmari Länsman et al. vs. Finland is particularly 
instructive.29 This case dealt with the decision of the Finnish Central Forestry Board to pass a 
contract with a private company to allow stone quarrying in a reindeer-herding area, home to 
a Sami community. The applicant claimed that this agreement violated the Sami right to 
enjoy their own culture, traditionally based on reindeer husbandry, as established by Article 
27 of the ICCPR. Acknowledging that the authors of the communication were consulted and 
their interests were considered during the proceedings leading to the delivery of the quarrying 
permit by the state, the HRC found that Finland had not violated Article 27. Crucially, the 
main reason behind the HRC’s finding that no violation of Article 27 had occurred was that 
quarrying, in the amount that had taken place at the time, had only a limited impact on the 
way of life of the concerned communities and thus did not amount to a denial of their rights. 
Accordingly, in the eventuality of a more substantial impact on the way of life of the 
indigenous communities concerned, it is plausible that the HRC would have demanded more 
than mere consultation before deciding in favour of the state.30 These considerations suggest 
that the HRC privileges a dynamic approach to FPIC, whose meaning may vary in 
accordance with the impact that a particular project or activity will have on indigenous 
peoples. 
This perception was confirmed by a recent pronouncement, in which the HRC noted that, 
when measures substantially compromise or interfere with the rights of indigenous peoples, 
states must guarantee their effective participation in the decision-making process.31 Crucially, 
the HRC emphasized that this would require not only mere consultation but, also, their free, 
prior and informed consent.32 Accordingly, it can be said that, despite avoiding any express 
reference to the distinction between small and large-scale development projects, the HRC 
supports the so-called ‘sliding scale approach’ to indigenous participatory rights in 
connection to projects affecting their lands. 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) may be in the process 
of developing a similar approach to the one employed by the HRC. In the general comment 
on the right to culture included in Article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, the CESCR listed the obligations that states parties have to 
respect in order to ensure the satisfaction of that provision.33 Among other things, it noted that 
states should ‘allow and encourage the participation of … indigenous peoples … in the 
design and implementation of laws and policies that affect them’.34 Significantly, the CESCR 
also specified that ‘states parties should obtain their free and informed prior consent when the 
preservation of their cultural resources, especially those associated with their way of life and 
cultural expression, are at risk’.35 Without expressly elaborating on this point, the general 
comment seems to introduce two different levels of protection in relation to measures 
affecting indigenous peoples. Accordingly, laws and policies that threaten the preservation of 
the cultural distinctiveness of these peoples could only be adopted with their free, prior and 
informed consent. In a more radical way, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD) stressed in a general comment that no decisions directly relating to 
the rights and interests of indigenous peoples should be taken without their informed 
consent.36 This straightforward position, which seems to contrast with the sliding scale 
approach promoted by other human rights bodies, has been confirmed in various concluding 
observations.37 On other occasions, however, CERD has taken a more nuanced approach to 
FPIC, indicating, for example, that states should consult indigenous peoples in order to obtain 
their consent, or that they should endeavour to obtain, or seek, such consent.38 
The above considerations indicate that a coherent uniform practice on FPIC among human 
rights treaty bodies has yet to emerge clearly. That said, there is evidence to suggest that the 
Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights have 
validated the importance of a sliding scale approach to indigenous peoples’ participatory 
rights, linking the issue of FPIC with the nature of a proposed initiative and the effects that it 
will have on their fundamental human rights, in line with the more elaborated and detailed 
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
In February 2010 the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) issued 
an important decision in the Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) vs. 
Kenya case.39 The case dealt with the Endorois’ claim that the Government had removed them 
from their ancestral lands without prior consultation and adequate compensation, thus 
violating, inter alia, their right to property, natural resources and development as recognized 
respectively by Articles 14, 21 and 22 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(1981) (Charter). With respect to FPIC, the main finding of the case refers to the alleged 
violation of Article 22 on the right to development. The ACHPR specified that states have a 
duty 
not only to consult with the community, but also to obtain their free, prior, and informed 
consent, according to their customs and traditions [in relation to] any development or 
investment projects that would have a major impact within [their] territory.40 
Applying this general principle to the case in question, it noted that Kenya ‘did not obtain the 
prior, informed consent of all the Endorois before designating their land as a Game Reserve 
and commencing their eviction.’41 
While this reasoning fully upholds the IACtHR’s jurisprudence on FPIC that was 
discussed above, another passage of the judgment raises some doubts as to the overall 
position of the ACHPR. In addressing the circumstances under which the land rights of 
indigenous peoples could be restricted in accordance with Article 14 of the Charter,42 the 
ACHPR found that, among other things, states must consult the peoples concerned before 
encroaching on their property rights and provide, if necessary, adequate compensation. At 
that point, the ACHPR sought to clarify the meaning and scope of this consultative process. 
In doing so, and without expressly referring to it, the ACHPR endorsed a radical 
interpretation of FPIC by saying that ‘[i]n terms of consultation, the threshold is especially 
stringent in favour of indigenous peoples, as it also requires that consent be accorded’.43 In the 
subsequent passage, however, the ACHPR noted that ‘failure to observe the obligations to 
consult and seek consent … ultimately results in a violation of the right to property’. Whether 
in the ACHPR’s view states should obtain or merely seek the consent of the indigenous 
peoples concerned remains, therefore, unclear. While future engagement with the issue of 
FPIC will certainly shed light on the above questions, the  decision seems in line with the 
emerging flexible understanding of FPIC that is discussed in this chapter. In this sense, it is 
important to highlight that the ACHPR’s findings draw almost entirely on the jurisprudence 
of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, confirming a fundamental alignment between 
the reasoning and approach of the two bodies (Pentassuglia 2011, 187). 
UN bodies dealing specifically with indigenous peoples’ rights 
The Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the Expert Mechanism on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (EMRIP) have each dedicated particular attention to the 
issue of FPIC in relation to development projects on indigenous lands. The interpretation 
promoted by these two bodies is particularly important in order to clarify the meaning and 
scope of FPIC in Article 32(2) of the Declaration because their activities are carried out 
precisely in accordance with the normative framework of that instrument. 
With this in mind, it is interesting to observe that it was the former Special Rapporteur on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, who, in 2003, introduced the 
distinction between small and large-scale development projects (Stavenhagen 2003). In his 
report, which was referred to by the IACtHR in the Saramaka case, major developments were 
described as: 
process[es] of investment of public and/or private, national or international capital for 
the purpose of building or improving the physical infrastructure of a specified region, 
the transformation over the long run of productive activities involving changes in the 
use of and property rights to land, the large-scale exploitation of natural resources 
including subsoil resources, the building of urban centres, manufacturing and/or mining, 
power, extraction and refining plants, tourist developments, port facilities, military 
bases and similar undertakings. 
(Stavenhagen 2003, para. 6) 
Stavenhagen was particularly concerned about the profound social and economic changes 
that these projects are likely to cause in the territories and lives of the indigenous peoples 
concerned. The subsequent Special Rapporteur, James Anaya, followed this path, 
highlighting that ‘the strength or importance of the objective of achieving consent [should 
vary] according to the circumstances and the indigenous interests involved’ (Anaya 2009, 
para. 47). This means that a ‘direct impact on indigenous peoples’ lives or territories 
establishes a strong presumption that the proposed measure should not go forward without 
indigenous peoples’ consent’ and that, ‘in certain contexts, that presumption may harden into 
a prohibition of the measure or project in the absence of indigenous consent’ (Anaya 2009, 
para. 47). 
The EMRIP has taken a similar approach to that developed by the Special Rapporteur. In a 
recent study on the right of indigenous peoples to participate in decision-making, the EMRIP 
noted that special attention should be paid to the issue of FPIC in relation to ‘projects or 
measures that have a substantial impact on indigenous communities, such as those resulting 
from large-scale natural resource extraction on their territories or the creation of natural 
parks, or forest and game reserves on their lands and territories’.44 The advisory paper which 
followed the study highlighted that, in accordance with the normative framework of the 
UNDRIP, FPIC should be obtained ‘in matters of fundamental importance for [the] rights, 
survival, dignity and well-being [of indigenous peoples]’.45 The paper further specified that 
in assessing whether a matter is of importance to the indigenous peoples concerned, 
relevant factors include the perspective and priorities of the indigenous peoples 
concerned, the nature of the matter or proposed activity and its potential impact on the 
indigenous peoples concerned.46 
Crucially, the paper also highlighted that states’ duty to obtain the FPIC of indigenous 
peoples implies that the latter have the prerogative to ‘withhold consent and to establish terms 
and conditions for their consent’.47 
The International Labour Organization 
The International Labour Organization Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 
169) (Convention 169) is the only international treaty concerning indigenous rights still open 
to ratification.48 More importantly, it is widely regarded as ‘a central feature of international 
law’s contemporary treatment of indigenous peoples’ demands’ (Anaya 2004, 58). For these 
reasons, an analysis of FPIC would not be complete without a discussion of this important 
convention. 
At the outset, it should be highlighted that the rights to consultation and participation 
represent the cornerstone of Convention 169.49 In this respect, Article 6 affirms the right of 
indigenous peoples to be consulted and to freely participate at all levels of decision-making 
when policies and programmes might affect them. Furthermore, the convention fully 
acknowledges and protects the special relationship between indigenous peoples and their 
lands. Article 13, in particular, establishes that governments shall respect the special 
importance for the cultures and spiritual values of indigenous peoples of their relationship 
with their lands, while Article 7 recognizes the right of indigenous peoples to own their lands 
and to ‘exercise control, to the extent possible, over their own economic, social and cultural 
development’. Within this normative context, Article 15 establishes that indigenous peoples’ 
rights to the natural resources pertaining to their lands shall be specially safeguarded. 
Crucially, these rights include the right to participate in the use, management and 
conservation of these resources. At the same time, Article 15 recognizes that states may retain 
the ownership of mineral or sub-surface resources or rights to other resources pertaining to 
lands. In such cases, Convention 169 requires that governments consult indigenous peoples 
‘with a view to ascertaining whether and to what degree their interests would be prejudiced, 
before undertaking or permitting any programmes for the exploration or exploitation of such 
resources pertaining to their lands’. While this passage could be read as introducing a link 
between the level of protection to be accorded to indigenous peoples and the seriousness of 
the impact of a particular project, the ILO governing body has clarified that under no 
circumstances should Article 15 be interpreted as requesting that consultations necessarily 
lead to agreement or consent.50 Rather, consultations should be conducted with a view to 
finding ‘appropriate solutions in an atmosphere of mutual respect and full participation’,51 so 
that indigenous peoples could have ‘a realistic chance of affecting the outcome’52 of the 
relevant process. 
This suggests that Convention 169 endorses a pragmatic approach to FPIC, seeking to 
empower indigenous peoples without, however, going as far as granting them the right to 
oppose unwanted projects which could have a serious negative impact on their rights and 
lives. While this prudent approach is not in line with the growing international consensus on 
FPIC that is discussed in this chapter, it should be noted that Article 35 of Convention 169 
establishes that the provisions of the convention should not prevent indigenous peoples from 
enjoying more favourable rights pursuant to, inter alia, other international instruments, thus 
acknowledging that certain provisions of the convention could fall below existing 
international legal standards.53 In this sense, the emergence of a clear, coherent and uniform 
practice on FPIC could lead gradually to a more progressive interpretation of the relevant 
provisions of Convention 169. 
Conclusions 
Article 32(2) of the UNDRIP recognizes that indigenous peoples should be consulted before 
states may launch or authorize development projects on their lands. Crucially, the principle of 
free, prior and informed consent sets out the manner in which the relevant process of 
consultation should be carried out. FPIC may have significantly different implications 
depending on the way in which one understands it. At a minimum, it requires that states 
should consult indigenous peoples in good faith and with a view to reaching an agreement; in 
a more radical manner, it could mean that states should obtain the consent of the indigenous 
peoples concerned before moving forward with their proposed plan. The language of Article 
32(2) does not in itself provide a definitive answer to this fundamental question. However, by 
placing this provision within the normative framework of the UNDRIP and analysing the 
practice of judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, this chapter has highlighted the emergence of a 
flexible approach to FPIC that is gaining increasing recognition at the international level. On 
the basis of this model, indigenous peoples do not enjoy a right to veto in relation to all 
matters affecting their lands. That said, when a development project is likely to have a serious 
(negative) impact on their cultures and, ultimately, lives, states should obtain their consent 
before implementing it. Although it is clear that further judicial elaboration is needed to add 
clarity to this complex regime, this approach to FPIC promises to tackle the question of 
‘consent’ in a constructive manner, focusing on the need adequately to protect the 
fundamental human rights of indigenous peoples. In doing so, it contributes to reverse a 
tradition of injustice and discrimination by seeking to prevent that states’ interests 
systematically and indiscriminately prevail over those of indigenous peoples. 
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